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Where's my mommy? She should be here with me stopping this. I am
just a baby. I am in a crib in a dark room. I can hear everything.
Mommy and Daddy were talking and then someone is touching me,
rubbing me, holding me close. Kissing me, my lips, rough kissing, a
tongue. I feel his scratchy face against my face, between my legs.
Help me mommy, please, help me. Don't let him do this to me. Am I
asleep? Is it a dream? No it is happening. It feels so good. It feels so
awful. I like it. I hate it. I hate it. He's my Daddy! Hands are every-
where, hands and things touching me, rubbing me, poking me, in me.
Daddy keeps telling me he loves me and that is why. He tells me he
loves me so much, more than he even loves mommy, more than he
loves anything or anyone and I am his special little girl. He tells me it
is what his little girl is for - to make him happy. To love him back
because he loves me so much. He keeps telling me that it makes him
happy when I make him feel good. He tells me it feels so good, so
good that I should feel good too. But it feels awful, ugly, dirty, sick. I
hate myself He keeps telling me it's what every little girl does for her
dad. It's how he knows I love him. I have to show him my love. I
wanted to tell mother what daddy was doing to me. But he told me
she'd be mad if I told. Mad because then she would know he loved me
more than he loved her. 'Don't ever tell your mom,' he'd say. 'She
wouldn't understand.' 'She might even throw you out of the house.' I
wanted a lock on my door to keep him out, to let him in. I don't know
what I wanted but I knew it was wrong. Why is this happening to me
now, still. I'm 13 years old. When I was little I didn't know any better.
I knew how awful it felt but daddy kept telling me it's what little girls
did, what every little girl did for her dad. But it was wrong! I know
that now, wrong! I don't know what to do - how to stop it. I love
him. He's a monster. I love him. He's gross. I love him. I hate him.
He's my dad. Mom is gone now. Dad told me she found out about
us, about how much we loved each other and that is why she left.
Sometimes I can't even go to school. He wants me home with him.
Some kids might think it is cool staying home from school but I'd
rather be anywhere than here, anywhere. Dirty that is how I feel most
of the time. I hate men. I hate myself. I hate everything. Sometimes
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my skin feels like it is crawling. I hurt myself I dig my nails into my
arms and legs. Make myself bleed because that hurt makes the other
hurt go away. I started cutting into my legs with a small knife. Just
little cuts. The blood is warm, wet like tears. I want to die. I think
about it a lot. I think about how to do it. Then the pain will stop. I
want it all to stop. It's really my fault. Daddy wouldn't do this to me
unless I made him. He wouldn't touch me like that or let others do it,
so many others. It must be me. Something is wrong with me. I want
him to die so it will end. I want him to die. I love him. I hate Him. I
hate me more. Dead. Dead.'
Tina was fifteen years old when she died of kidney failure resulting
from anorexia.2 Child sexual abuse, like Tina's, can be found in all races
and all socioeconomic levels.3 Reports show that certain sub-groups of
women, such as children, may suffer from sexual abuse rate as high as
62%.' One in five girls will be sexually victimized before the age of eigh-
teen, almost all by a family member or an acquaintance.5 In Texas, the
sex crimes division of the San Antonio Police Department responded to
1. See TINA'S STORY (A Shoots Production Film 2001). This video is available for
purchase from Jewish Family and Children Services. Tina contacted the San Antonio Rape
Crises Center for years, and before her death she sent her diary to the Center so other
victims of intrafamilial sexual assault would know they are not alone. The movie was
based on her diary. Emily Spicer, Film Tells Teen's Story of Abuse; Tina's Story Relates
Her 11 Years of Sexual Torture by Her Father and His Friends, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS
NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, 2001 WL 24772192.
2. See Spicer, supra note 1 (stating after 11 years of sexual abuse, Tina died of kidney
failure related to her anorexia); KAREN KLNNEAR, CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE: A REFER-
ENCE HANDBOOK, 41 (1995) (stating many victims of sexual abuse are concerned about
their physical appearance, some may lose weight, while others may gain weight to make
sure that no one is attracted to them); see also Sana Loue, Legal and Epidemiological
Aspects of Child Maltreatment, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 471, 480-81 (relating sexual abuse has
been associated with eating disorders and feelings of helplessness and self-blame).
3. Melissa Fletcher-Stoeltje, Fighting Child Sexual Abuse Epidemic Takes Money,
Support, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Dec. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 30312596; see
KINNEAR, supra note 2, at 20 (stating that in a random sample of over 900 adult women, D.
Russell discovered one in six women were sexually abused by their step-fathers while one
in forty were abused by their biological fathers); Loue, supra note 2, at 479 (stating that
"child sexual abuse occurs across all socioeconomic strata, religious orientations, and
races").
4. See John H. Biebel, I Thought She Said Yes: Sexual Assault in England and
America, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 153, 158-59 (1995) (stating that children are a
subgroup of women who suffer a higher rate of sexual abuse but are rarely studied); Loue,
supra note 2, at 478-79 (reciting that studies report 54% of women have experienced sexual
abuse prior to age 18 when a broad definition of sexual abuse is used).
5. Fletcher-Stoeltje, supra note 3.
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847 cases of aggravated sexual assault with a child during the year 2000.6
However, larger numbers go unreported due to the secretive nature of
intrafamilial sexual assaults.7
I. INTRODUCTION
It is true [that] rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought
severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be
remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never
so innocent.
8
Currently in Texas, the State only has to show sexual penetration oc-
curred in order to convict a perpetrator of a first degree felony of aggra-
vated sexual assault when the victim is younger than fourteen years of
age.9 No force has to be shown."0 However, sexual assault victims four-
teen to sixteen years of age must show that serious bodily harm occurred
as a result of force in order to obtain a charge of aggravated sexual as-
sault.11 Force does not usually occur with intrafamilial sexual abuse due
to the dynamics of authority between family members.12 For this reason,
6. Spicer, supra note 1.
7. See Thomasine Heitkamp and Tara Lea Muhlhauser, Children in the Courts: Re-
thinking and Challenging Our Traditions, 66 N.D. L. REV. 649, 654 (1990) (asserting that
the dynamics of secrecy surrounding cases of intrafamilial abuse limit the number of re-
ports); see also Fletcher-Stoeltje, supra note 3 (expressing that family violence needs dark-
ness to thrive and it depends on secrets to survive); Rebecca L. Thomas, Adult Survivors of
Childhood Sexual Abuse and Statutes of Limitations: A Call for Legislative Action, 26
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1245, 1249 (1991) (stating abusive sexual relationships "depend on
concealment, emotional blackmail, threats, and an imbalance of power for their
sustenance").
8. Beverly J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A Look at
the Law of Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 806 (1996).
9. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.021 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2002).
10. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2003) (defining seri-
ous bodily injury as "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes
death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily member or organ").
11. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Aggravated sexual assault of
a victim fourteen to sixteen years of age requires prohibited sexual penetration without
consent in addition to either causing serious bodily injury, placing the victim in fear of their
life or another person's life, or using or displaying a deadly weapon. Id.; see also TEX. PEN.
CODE ANN. §1.07(46) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2003) (defining serious bodily injury as "bod-
ily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ").
12. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CHILD ABUSE REPORTED TO THE POLICE 4-5 (2001) (stating that only 1-2% of
[Vol. 5:293
INTRAFAMILIAL SEXUAL ABUSE
the State is frequently unable to punish perpetrators who sexually abuse
family members between fourteen and sixteen years of age with the
charge of aggravated sexual assault. 13 Therefore, the State can only
charge perpetrators who sexually abuse family members between four-
teen to sixteen years of age with sexual assault, resulting in a lower pen-
alty.14 The unfortunate effect is a legal disadvantage for an adolescent
victim of intrafamilial sexual assault. 5
At present, Texas requires adolescents who are between fourteen and
sixteen years of age and victims of intrafamilial sexual assault to prove
serious bodily injury16 resulting from force in order to heighten the pun-
ishment of their perpetrators. As a result, Texas unjustly concedes two
things. First, nonconsensual intercourse without force resulting in serious
bodily injury is merely an act of sex. 7 Second, sexual relations between
family members when one party is between fourteen and sixteen years of
age is not considered to be as serious as other sexual assaults, if no force
resulting in serious bodily injury is required in order to consummate the
offenses by caretakers involved the use of weapons or resulted in injuries) [hereinafter
CHILD ABUSE REPORTED TO THE POLICE]; LEORA N. ROSEN & MICHELLE ETLIN, THE
HOSTAGE CHILD: SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY DISPUTES, 12-13 (1986)
(stating victims do not resist the father's demands for sexual contact because they are
frightened and confused).
13. See Smith v. State, 719 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no
writ) (commenting that even though the appellant created a situation in which the victim
was forced to submit to his demands, it did not rise to the level of aggravated sexual assault
because there was a lack of force); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.021(e) (Vernon 1994) (stat-
ing that aggravated sexual assault constitutes a first degree felony); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 12.32(a) (Vernon's 1994) (indicating that the penalty for first degree felony is imprison-
ment for life "or for any term of not more than 99 years or" not less than 5 years and, in
addition, the court can impose a fine no greater than $10,000).
14. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.011 (Vernon's 1994) (stating that sexual assault
constitutes a second degree felony); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.33 (Vernon's 1994 & Supp.
2003) (denoting the penalty for second degree felony is imprisonment of not greater than
20 years or not less than 2 years and, in addition, the court can impose a fine of no more
than $10,000).
15. See CHILI) ABUSE REPORTED TO THE POLICE, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that
sentences regarding offences against teenage victims were less severe than for other of-
fenders). This may be due to a stereotypical view of the victim feeling responsible for his
or her own victimization. Id.
16. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (Vernon 1994) (defining serious bodily in-
jury as that which "creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious perma-
nent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ").
17. See Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory
Rape Laws, 4 VA. U. SoC. POL'Y & L. 287, 288 (1997) (stating that forcible rape laws
recognize only the most violent forms of sexual coercion.) The law in some states finds




act. 8 Requiring force conveys a message that the sexual assault is not
damaging enough without serious bodily injury.1 9 It also furthers the re-
quirement in Texas that adolescents either be seriously injured,2 ° in fear
of their life, or in fear of a deadly weapon before it is defined as a crime
punishable between five and ninety-nine years to life.21
The State of New Jersey has an exception clause in their aggravated
sexual assault statute that protects adolescents between thirteen to six-
teen years of age from intrafamilial sexual assault.22 The exception does
not require the proof of seriously bodily injury resulting from force to
constitute aggravated sexual assault when the perpetrator is either: re-
lated to the victim; has supervisory or disciplinary powers over the victim;
or stands in loco parentis, which includes foster parents, within the house-
hold.2 3 This comment advocates that Texas legislators should follow this
New Jersey exception clause by adding it to the force requirement under
the current aggravated sexual assault statute. This would protect Texas
adolescents from an unhealthy home environment and prevent the family
perpetrator from hiding within the sanctity of the family.
II. HISTORY
Deep water has no ford.
The broad field has no end.
Small stones have no number.
A pretty girl has no kinsmen.2 4
18. See Ross, supra note 8 (summarizing that due to "deep-seated taboos, inhibitions,
and psychological conflicts associated with sex, charges of rape that do not involve stran-
gers are treated by police, prosecutors, judges, juries, and even a complainant's friends and
family in a substantially different manner than are rapes perpetrated by strangers"); Susan
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 1087, 1092 (1986) (differentiating "real" rape, which is com-
mitted by a stranger, and "non-traditional" rape, which occurs when the woman is raped by
someone she knows).
19. See Kitrosser, supra note 17, at 292-93 (stating coercive sex is normal enough until
it reaches a level of violence judged by a "male-centered, bar-fighting, boys-on-the-play-
ground perspective that courts can understand").
20. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (Vernon's 1999).
21. See McQueen v. State, 423 So.2d 800, 807 (Miss. 1982) (Hawkins, J., dissenting)
(questioning whether the victim should be mangled or see a deadly weapon and if so, we
ignore the reality of fear and terror in a child's mind.)
22. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2002).
23. Id.




A. Incest: Prohibition and Restriction on Marriage
Incest is a prohibition against sex between close family members.
Historically, prohibition of and references to incest have influenced laws
restricting incest.2' Early references to incest can be found in Greek my-
thology and the Bible.2 7 More current references to incest can be found
in movies28 and literature. 29 These references led to the development of
laws in society.
The earlier laws, aimed at adults, were written to prevent sexual rela-
tions between close relatives in order to prevent birth defects associated
with flawed genetic combinations. 30 These laws were not meant to pro-
25. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY, 193 (2nd ed. 2001) [hereinafter GALE];
see KINNEAR, supra note 2, at 6 (stating sexual relations among family members are
wrong); OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 331-32 (1980) (defining incest as prohibited sex-
ual relations between family members) [hereinafter OXFORD]. See also KEITH GREEN AND
MELODY GREEN, LAST DAYS MINISTRIES, INCEST, THE FAMILY SECRET, at http://www.last
daysministires.org/articles/incest.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003) (defining incest as sexual
intercourse between persons who are too closely related to marry).
26. See LLOYD DEMAUSE, INST. FOR PSYCHOHISTORY, THE UNIVERSALITY OF IN-
CEST, available at www.psychohistory.com/htm/06al-incest.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003)
(stating that incest is the one universal trait that has been found in every known culture).
27. See Leviticus 18:7-18:9 (stating that one shall not uncover his father's or mother's
nakedness); Id. at 20:11-20:12 (declaring that one shall not uncover his sister's or aunt's
nakedness); Deuteronomy 27:22 (proclaiming that one will be cursed if he lies with his
sister or step-sister); Genesis 19:36 (stating Lot married his daughter and then she bore his
children); Exodus 6:20 (stating that Amram married his Aunt); see Into Darkness: An Ex-
ploration of Incest in History and Entertainment, at http://www.darkhistory.com (last visited
May 12, 2003) [hereinafter Into Darkness] (noting that, in addition to Oedipus, "Greek
Mythology is full of incestuous relationships," among them the creation of Chiron, born
from Zeus and Ixion, son of Ares, and of Pandora by brothers Zeus, Hephaistos and
Hermes).
28. See THE GLADIATOR (Universal Studios 2000) (showing Commodus lust for his
sister Lucilla); SLEEPWALKERS (Columbia Tri-Star 1992) (showing Charles Brady's incestu-
ous relationship with his on-screen mother); FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994)
(implying that Forrest's girlfriend's incestuous relationship with her father kept her from
forming a healthy relationship).
29. See Jacob Grimm & Wilhelm Grimm, All Kinds of Fur, in Incest in INDo-EURo-
PEAN FOLKTALES (D.L. Ashliman trans., 1997), at http://www.pitt.edu/-dash/grimm065.
html) (last visited May 12, 2003) (describing how a father marries his own daughter after
the death of his wife); see D.L. ASHLIMAN, THE FATHER WHO WANTED TO MARRY HIS
DAUGHTER (1997), at http://www.surelalunefairytales.com/pentamerone/15shebear1911.
html (last visited Mar. 14, 2003) (describing The She-Bear how a father who promises his
dying wife not to marry unless he finds someone as beautiful as her, marries his own
daughter and Fair Maria Wood stating how a father wanted to marry his daughter after his
wife dies but his daughter hides and then marries him later); Into Darkness, supra note 27
(listing different movie and literature references to incest).
30. See Joanne Grossman, Should the Law Be Kinder to "Kissing Cousins," THE
WRIT, Apr. 8, 2002, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20020408.html (last
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tect children from intrafamilial sexual abuse, but rather to prevent
inbreeding.
31
Henry VIII created an early example of such a law in 1534.32 This law,
called "An Act Concerning the King's Succession," followed the book of
Leviticus to legitimize Henry's marriage to Anne Boleyn and assured
self-promotion and self-legitimization of his heirs. 33 This law did not pro-
hibit sexual abuse of children by their parents but prohibited marriages
between relatives. As a result of the laws regarding inheritance at that
time, the law invalidated heirs to the throne but not intrafamilial sexual
abuse.34 Henry VIII's self-serving law legitimized his marriage and heirs
by illegitimatizing his past wives' current marriage and formed the incest
laws in the United States.35
B. Early American Law Prohibiting Incest
Henry VIII's Succession Act was used as a model to form early Con-
necticut and Vermont laws prohibiting incest.36 The Connecticut General
Court punished the crime of incest with a penalty of death for both par-
ties. 37 Although a stiff sentence today, death was a common penalty for a
multitude of crimes during that period.38 The Vermont statute enacted in
1779 defined incest as marriage or carnal copulation between persons too
closely related.3 9 According to the Vermont statute, both parties were to
be set in the stocks, whipped and made to wear the letter "I" on their
clothing.4" The punishment was comparatively light during that time and
focused more on the moral indignation of the act by both parties.41
visited Mar. 8, 2003) (stating that today's justification for the statutory incest laws are ge-
netic problems for the children the union may produce).
31. Dan Cook, Parents Who Rape Their Kids Don't Deserve a Break, Bus. J. OF PORT-
LAND, Dec. 3, 1999, available at http://www.portland.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/1999/
12/06/tidbits.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2003).
32. BRUCE THOMAS BOEHRER, MONARCHY AND INCEST IN RENAISSANCE ENGLAND:
LITERATURE, CULTURE, KINSHIP, AND KINGSHIP 1 (1992).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2.
36. See id. at 20 (stating that Henry VIII contributed to the shaping of an academic
field that does not yet exist).
37. See Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 1501, 1527-28 (1998).
38. Id. at 1528 (listing numerous death penalty offenses, including blasphemy, treason,
arson, rape, murder, and even rebelliousness towards a parent, all with references to bibli-
cal sources).
39. Id. at 1525.
40. Id. at 1527 (explaining how both parties to the act were punished even though the
statute only mentioned the prohibition of male sexual behavior).
41. See id. at 1527-28 (comparing how punishment evolved from mere social humilia-
tion to the more serious punishment of death).
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These traditional incest statutes provided orderly regulation of mar-
riage.12 The statutes may have also prevented inbreeding and affirmed
moral and religious ideas that society gained from religious teachings.43
These statutes finally provided a way to punish deviate or exploitative
sexual behavior." In essence, the Vermont and Connecticut incest stat-
utes were not created to address sex crimes between family members but
to promote societal values and medical findings.45
C. Contemporary Confusion I: How to Handle Incest
Frigid gentlewomen of the jury! I had thought that months, perhaps
years, would elapse before I dared to reveal myself to Dolores Haze,
but by six she was awake, and by six fifteen we were technically lovers.
I am going to tell you something very strange: it was she who seduced
me.
46
In the nineteenth century, the intent element for statutory rape was
confused with the intent element for incest.47 This confusion was due to
prosecution of incest cases under statutory rape laws.48 Although courts
prosecuted allegations of incest under statutory rape laws, they also
looked on the parties as co-conspirators.49 Consequently, in an incest
case, collaboration and outcry of the victim were required before incest
could be proven.5" Collaboration required a witness to testify to some
42. See id. at 1524-25 (showing that Vermont's 1779 statute "proscribes criminal pun-
ishment, declares marriage void, and regulates descent and distribution").
43. See id. at 1527-28. Many capital statutes of this time period cite biblical sources to
prohibit certain acts. Id.
44. See id. (citing Connecticut's "Carnal Copulation" Law of 1650 including incest,
bestiality, and rape).
45. See Joyce McConnell, Incest Conundrum: Judicial Discourse on Private Wrong
and Public Harm, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 143, 146 (1992) (stating that incest taboo has
served to protect society not the individual from harm). Incest taboos address "the ge-
netic, social, and economic needs of human societies." Id. These taboos protect "society
from genetic inbreeding, supports the development of alliances between families through
the multiplication of kinship ties, and ensures the solidarity of families through the reduc-
tion of intrafamilial sexual competition." Id.
46. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, Lolita, in NOVELS 1955-1962, 124 (1996).
47. See Bienen, supra note 37, at 1533 (stating that the intent element for statutory
rape is knowledge of the prohibited age and the intent element for incest is knowledge of
the prohibited relationship).
48. See id. at 1534 (1998) (stating that incest cases came to be prosecuted under the
statutory rape laws.)
49. See id. at 1534-35 (noting that when incest was committed by consenting adults it
evolved into the idea that an under-aged daughter was an accomplice to the crime).
50. See Bolin v. State, 505 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Tex. 1974) (holding that without cor-
roborating evidence that the victim did not consent to the incestuous relationship, the vic-
tim is "an accomplice as a matter of law"); State v. Foust, 588 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1978)
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part of the victim's allegations. 5  This was due to the fact that the incest
victim was determined to be a co-conspirator to the crime and co-conspir-
ator testimony alone cannot convict another conspirator.5 2 The "outcry
requirement" required the victim to tell someone else of the incident al-
leged within a certain time period.53 Eventually, the collaboration outcry
requirement was not required to prove sexual abuse of a child by a non-
family member if the victim told someone about the abuse within six
months of the incident. 54 Thus, proving sexual abuse by a non-family
member was easier to prove than sexual abuse by a family member.55
D. Contemporary Confusion II: How to Handle Rape
If girls are not virgins, they are much less valuable as barterable mer-
chandise between families or clans. Past marriages patterns were con-
trolled by ongoing political and economic needs of male-headed
families. Marry a virgin off well and you could gain powerful allies,
or a chance at inheriting valuable property, or a friend at court. The
incest ban guaranteed that daughters would be delivered to their hus-
bands in a condition of virginity that would prevent occasions for dis-
turbing the peace.56
(concluding absent corroborating evidence the "complainant is free to designedly point the
finger of guilt at one, who, for lack of an alibi or witness, may find himself unlawfully
incarcerated").
51. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 517-18 (5-4 decision) (2000). The majority
held that applying the amended Texas statute that removed the corroboration requirement
for victims eighteen years old or older to incest offenses committed under the old law
requiring corroborative evidence for victims over fourteen years old violated the Ex Post
Facto clause of the constitution. Id. 530.
52. See Bolin, 505 S.W.2d at 913 (holding that if the female is an accomplice witness,
then there must be other evidence tending to inculpate the accused with the offense).
53. See Carmell, 529 U.S. at 517-18 (stating a victim's testimony can support a convic-
tion only if there was corroborating evidence or the victim told another within six months
of the incident).
54. Bienen, supra note 37, at 1540.
55. Id.; see JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 736-47
(1915) (setting forth a doctrine to impeach the credibility of any female, especially a child,
who complained of a sex offense). "Wigmore warned that women and girls are predis-
posed to bring false accusations against men of good character, and that these accusations
might convince unsuspecting judges and juries." HERMAN, supra note 24, at 11; Creek-
moore v. State, 860 S.W.2d 880, 884-87 (stating that when a parent is accused of abusing a
child extraneous acts of abuse by the accused should be allowed). "For too long the victims
of crime have been left out of the criminal process" and "this attitude gives an increasing
number of victims and their families the impression the state is more concerned with the
rights of the criminal than with those of the victim." Id. at 887.
56. BOEHRER, supra note 32, at 144; see CLAUDE LEvI-STRAuss, THE ELEMENTARY
STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (1949). The incest taboo is also a special case of a more genera-
lized principal of social organization called the rule of the gift. Id. The exchange of people
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The confusion dealing with how to legally categorize incest was further
compounded by courts' attempts to handle rape. Rape laws were insti-
tuted to protect females and patriarchal property interests in females.57
At the time of the creation of rape laws, children were seen as property of
the father or their male authority figure.58 The virginity of the female
child was also seen as an asset of the male authority figure.59 A father
could use his daughter's virginity to acquire a husband for her, thus re-
lieving his financial burden of caring for an unmarried daughter.60 In
sum, the female child and her virginity were the property of the father.
The person who violated this property did not owe restitution to the child
but to the true owner of the property, the father.6' Conversely, the father
should be able to do with her as he wished and not receive punishment
for any action.
Courts furthered this policy of protecting the patriarchal property
rights62 and the female's virginity in two ways. First, if a court discovered
that the child was not a virgin at the time of the alleged intrafamilial
sexual assault, they determined no harm had been caused.6 3 Secondly,
the court would reason that you cannot punish one for destroying one's
in marriage, the most serious and lasting kind of gift-giving, is governed by the rule of
exogamy. Id.
57. Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master's House: Of Protection, Patriarchy and the
Potential for Using the Master's Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 799, 802-03 (2001).
58. See id. (summarizing that statutory rape laws embodied that women and girls were
special property and if "damaged" the man may have to pay a fine to the father or be
required to marry her).
59. See Kitrosser, supra note 17, at 311-12 (discussing the "treasure theory" in statu-
tory rape law which casts a woman's virginity in terms of a "sexual treasure" with personal,
economic and social value); Oberman, supra note 57 (stating that a non-virgin was "less
likely to bring a financial reward to her father").
60. See Oberman, supra note 57, at 802 (stating that if a daughter failed to marry
because of her non-virgin status, she usually resulted in a life long financial burden to her
father).
61. See id. (noting that the father could insist on restitution either in the form of mon-
etary compensation or by commanding the rapist to marry his daughter); McConnell, supra
note 45 (stating that the primary purpose of incest laws is to protect society and not to
protect the victim whose "personal harm has gone unrecognized, ignored or regarded as
secondary to the harm to society").
62. See HERMAN, supra note 24, at 219 (recollecting that after 20 years of studying
incest, it is now understood that father-daughter incest is a common, predictable abuse of
patriarchal power).
63. See Bienen, supra note 37, at 1544 (introducing evidence of the victim's previous




own property.64 If the child was the father's property he could then do
what he chose. The past statutory rape laws were created to protect the
father's property from others,6 5 not to protect his property from his own
actions.
Even after most states began reforming their rape laws in the 1970s,6 6
which eliminated the strong patriarchal property reference, rape laws still
include language from earlier times. Statutes still contain language distin-
guishing between certain ages of children that are in need of protection
from sexual assault.67 State statutes distinguish between ages of victims
to further the view that younger children need more protection than ado-
lescents.68 This distinction is a reflection of society's belief "that children
below a certain age are incapable of making significant, life-altering deci-
sions. ,69 In accordance, the model penal code suggests that states should
limit their laws to protecting girls under age ten reasoning that 99% of
nine year-old girls are pre-pubescent. 70  Even'after the rape reform
movement, there is a struggle by the States to statutorily protect adoles-
cents and reflect a change in society's belief at what age a child can be
expected to resist or consent to sexual contact.71
64. See Lisa Haberman, The Seduction of Power: An Analogy of Incest and Antebel-
lum Slavery, 13 HASTINGS L. J. 307, 311, 313 (2002) (stating that the relationship between
master and slave is similar to parent and child). Defenders of slavery likened the master/
slave relationship to the parent/child relationship, comparing slavery property interest and
reasoning that children may fall under the same class. Id. Supporters of slavery compared
the rights to the services of the slave to children and women, all resting upon common
property principles. Id.
65. See id. at 312 (stating that "sexual injuries to females historically have not been
taken seriously unless they interfered with the property-like interest that a father, husband
or brother had in the female.") These theories can explain why an incestuous relationship
has been ignored. Id.
66. See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role
for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 710-11 (2000).
67. See Oberman, supra note 57, at 804 (stating that during the twentieth century,
statutory rape laws still protected the male version of the "treasure theory" of virginity).
68. See Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and Criminal Law: In Search of Rea-
son, 22 SETON HALL LEoIS. J. 1, 34-35 (1997). The State's duty to protect children who
cannot protect themselves is sufficient when they are very young. However, older children
are not allowed the same protection due to gender stereotypes of girls being inherently
weak. Id.
69. See id. at 33-34 (stating that pre-pubescent children are incapable of giving con-
sent); see also Nider v. Commonwealth, 131 S.W. 1024,1027 (Ky. 1910) (stating that "[t]he
statute was enacted to protect female children who are of such tender years as to be unable
to appreciate the enormity of this offense").
70. See Model Penal Code § 213.1 (1980).
71. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE LEGISLATORS'
HANDBOOK FOR STATUTORY RAPE ISSUES 2 (2000) (noting that North Carolina and Penn-
sylvania raised the age to sixteen that would be covered by the statutory rape laws).
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E. Additional Policy Reasons For Not Believing Accusations of
Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse
Almost all of my women patients told me that they had been seduced
by their father. I was driven to recognize in the end that these reports
were untrue and so came to understand that the hysterical symptoms
are derived from phantasies and not from real occurrences. It was
only later that I was able to recognize in this phantasy of being se-
duced by the father the expression of the typical Oedipus complex in
women.
72
The question of what age a child acquires the ability to resist or consent
to sexual activity in addition to the distrust of young girls who assert alle-
gations of intrafamilial sexual abuse73 may be influenced by the Oedipus
and Electra complexes popularized by Sigmund Freud.74 Freud charac-
terized children between the ages of three and five as having an incestu-
ous desire toward the parent of the opposite sex.75 Oedipus refers to a
son's incestuous desires for his mother and Electra to a daughter's inces-
tuous desire for her father.76
These Freudian theories have furthered the court's dismissal of incest
charges by reasoning that females fantasize about relations with their fa-
thers, citing the Electra complex.77 Their reasoning is that if the abuse is
a fantasy of the child, then no act or harm occurred to the child. 78 Thus,
the courts exonerated a supposed innocent father from the feared false
accusations.7 9
72. HERMAN, supra note 24, at 7 (quoting Sigmund Freud).
73. See Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct. A Pro-
posalfor the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 402-03 (1988) (noting
that courts "have distrusted testimony of rape victims because women will lie about con-
sent for various reasons").
74. See Leigh Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry Wigmore's Use of Scien-
tific Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise of Evidence, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 235, 236
(1983) (stating that Sigmund Freud went to extreme lengths to suppress his own patients'
allegations of childhood sexual abuse as fantasies); Joseph J. Peters, Children Who Are
Victims of Sexual Assault and the Psychology of Offenders, 30 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 398,
401 (1976).
75. GALE, supra note 25, at 193.
76. Id.
77. See HERMAN, supra note 24, at 9 (stating the in 1896, Freud announced that child-
hood sexual trauma was the origin of every case of hysteria). Freud still referred to seduc-
tion by the father as an essential role in hysteria in personal correspondence but after
publicly renouncing the possibility never again publicly referred to fathers as sexual aggres-
sors of their daughters. Id.
78. Bienen, supra note 37, at 1542.
79. Id. at 1544.
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Freudian thought, combined with sexologists theory that incest could
be a positive, healthy experience, and that there was nothing wrong in
being a pederast or a rapist if the perpetrator is satisfied sexually,8" may
have reinforced decisions not to penalize a father's sexual abuse of his
children.8 1
F. Contemporary Confusion III: Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse in Family
Courts
The family court is presented with additional biases in the custody or
visitation context. First, whereas the objective of the criminal court is to
hold the perpetrator accountable,82 the family court's objective is focused
on maintaining the family while promoting the welfare of the individuals
within, particularly children.83 However, it is often not in the victim's
best interest to keep the family together,84 especially when treatment of
the intrafamilial perpetrator has proven itself ineffective.85 In addition,
treatment is a comparatively lighter sentence than incarceration, which
provides the family perpetrator with a lower penalty than the perpetrator
who has assaulted children outside their family unit.86
Second, family courts do not provide the same constitutional safe-
guards to individuals accused by family members of sexual abuse, as do
other courts in extra-familial sexual abuse cases. This may result in abuse
of the system. The rights that are denied defendants in cases of in-
trafamilial sexual abuse include the right to an attorney at state expense,
the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront witnesses. The failure to
provide these rights can interfere with the final disposition of a case in
80. See DeMause, supra note 26 (finding that scholars have justified incest by showing
the widespread occurrence of incestuous relationships); Mr. Doubleena's Incest Forum, at
http://www.doubleena.com/ubb/Forum/HMTL/000487.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2003) (find-
ing comfort in other's pederast or incestuous experiences and fantasies).
81. Bienen, supra note 37, at 1542-43.
82. See Donald C. Bross, Terminating the Parent-Child Legal Relationship As a Re-
sponse to Child Sexual Abuse, 26 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 287, 295 (1995). The objective of the
criminal court is to deter crimes against children by holding the perpetrator accountable.
Id. In contrast, the civil court is focused on the safety of the child, parents, or family
through placement or adoption of the child and treatment of the perpetrator. Id.
83. McConnell, supra note 45, at 150.
84. See HERMAN, supra note 24 at 159-60 (describing the debate in the therapeutic
community as to whether it is necessarily in the best interest of the child to maintain the
family).
85. See Leonore M. J. Simon, Do Criminal Offenders Specialize in Crime Types?, 6
APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOLOGY 35, 45 (1997).
86. See Leonore M. J. Simon, Sex Offender Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effect
on Victims, 41 ARJz. L. REV. 485, 494-95 (1999) (illustrating a statute that determines pun-
ishment for sexual offenders on the basis of whether the offender is a stranger or a family
member, with incarceration for the former and treatment for the latter).
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family court.8 7 The lack of constitutional safeguards, combined with the
often-hostile nature of a custody dispute, furthers the argument in favor
of protecting the alleged perpetrator from false accusations. 88
Third, lack of constitutional safeguards for the accused is further com-
pounded by not requiring collaboration in a sexual assault allegation in
the family court setting.89 Because supporting evidence or collaboration
is rarely available in an intrafamilial sexual assault allegation, the child's
disclosure or the accusation of a victim's parent is the only evidence
presented.9" Justifiably, the court should approach the allegation with
caution and reluctance, especially when the allegation alone can serve the
divorcing spouse's personal agenda of obtaining sole custody9' or termi-
nating the alleged perpetrator's parental rights.92
Finally, in consideration of the foregoing matters, a family court judge
may feel pressure to encourage parents to reach an agreement to limit
custody/visitation rights to the victim instead of pursuing a contested trial
on the abuse issues. 93 This course of action may result in fewer in-
trafamilial sexual abuse perpetrators being incarcerated. Worse, it leaves
the perpetrator with continuing access, although limited or restricted, to
the victim. 94
87. Hon. Patricia S. Curley, Some Suggestions for Dealing with Sexual Assault Allega-
tions in Family Court, 15 No. 4 FAIR$HARE 17, 18 (1995).
88. See Patrick Parkinson, Family Law and Parent-Child Contact: Assessing the Risk of
Sexual Abuse, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 345, 348 (1999) (noting to the contrary that 2.5% of
551 United States cases studied resulted in erroneous reports).
89. Curley, supra note 87.
90. See Parkinson, supra note 82, at 347 (stating that a "major problem is the inherent
difficulty in obtaining corroborative evidence" to support allegations of a parent or the
disclosure of the child).
91. Curley, supra note 87.
92. See Bross, supra note 85, at 306-18. Courts have used the following factors in
evaluating whether to terminate parental rights in a sexual abuse allegation: the perpetra-
tor's denial of abuse and lack of progress in therapy, the severity of the abuse, whether
sexual abuse of the child was accompanied by other forms of abuse, and whether a substan-
tial risk of sexual abuse of other children exists. Id.
93. Curley, supra note 90.
94. See Theodore P. Cross et al., Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse: Which Cases Are
Accepted?, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT' 663, 664, 667 (1994) (stating that proportionately
more cases of extrafamilial child sexual abuse are prosecuted than cases of parental or
familial abuse). Other factors that may increase the likelihood of prosecution include: the
presence of oral-genital contact, the use of force, the duration of the abuse and the pres-
ence of physical and eyewitness evidence. Id. at 669.
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III. LEGAL THEORY AND CASE LAW REGARDING
INTRAFAMILIAL SEXUAL ABUSE
A. Alabama: A State Not Willing to Include the Whole Family in
"Intrafamilial"
Presently, Alabama requires evidence of forcible compulsion to prove
rape in the first degree.95 Forcible compulsion is defined as "physical
force that overcomes earnest resistance or a threat, express or implied,
that places a person in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury
to himself or another person."96 The Alabama courts have attempted to
form an exception for victims of intrafamilial sexual abuse by expanding
the definition of implied threat, which places a person in fear of immedi-
ate death or serious physical injury.9 7 Alabama has reasoned that the
position of the parent alone may provide the implied threat that placed
the victim in fear and caused them to submit without force.98 The courts
have further expanded the implied threat to other family members and
authority figures.99 The Alabama Supreme Court has recently rejected
this expansion.
The Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex parte J.A.P.,'0 decided not to
extend the implied threat theory to sibling perpetrators of intrafamilial
sexual abuse.1 'O In J.A.P., a brother sexually assaulted his sister repeat-
edly for years.' The victim did not resist nor did the defendant use
force to complete the sexual assault.' 0 3 Before each assault the defen-
dant would play a pornographic video.0 4 Thus, each time a pornographic
movie was shown, the victim knew what to expect. 10 5 Although the
Court of Criminal Appeals found force, by using the implied threat the-
ory and totality of the circumstances, the Alabama Supreme Court re-
95. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (2002).
96. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60 (2002).
97. See Powe v. State, 597 So.2d 721, 726-29 (Ala. 1991) (holding that the force ele-
ment in a rape case differs if the victim is a child, as a child is susceptible to implied force
of the child-parent role, or the adult position of dominion over a child).
98. See id. at 728-29 (Ala. 1991) (noting that when a defendant who plays as an au-
thoritative figure in a child's life instructs the child to do certain actions, an implied threat
accompanies the instruction).
99. See B.E. v. State, 778 So.2d 863 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (extending an "authorita-
tive figure" to include a babysitter who sexually abused an eight year old child).
100. 2002 WL 31002843 at *4-*5 (Ala. 2002).
101. Ex parte J.A.P., 2002 WL 31002843 at *4-*5 (Ala. 2002); Powe, 597 So.2d at 729.






versed that decision, stating the implied threat theory should only apply
to parental perpetrators. 0 6
The Alabama Supreme Court has refused to expand the meaning of
forcible compulsion in sexual offenses involving child victims to encom-
pass situations that would not constitute forcible compulsion if the victim
were an adult. 10 7 Even though, the Alabama Supreme Court has previ-
ously accepted the implied threat theory as applicable to parental perpe-
trators, they would not extend it to include older sibling perpetrators.'08
Not only did the Alabama Supreme Court divert from precedent by not
finding force in J.A.P., they also diverted from precedent by not ex-
tending the implicit threat theory to siblings.1 9
The decision by the Alabama Supreme Court also reversed B.E. and
further narrowed the implicit threat theory only to adult parental perpe-
trators.110 In essence, Alabama children under seventeen but over twelve
who are sexually assaulted will not be able to seek aggravated sexual as-
sault unless force is used to complete the act."' If the actor is either over
the age of sixteen or is a parent who sexually assaults the adolescent vic-
tim, the victim cannot seek a higher penalty without proving force.11
B. Federal Awareness: Unwilling to Recognize the Dynamics of
Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse
The Child Abuse Reform and Enforcement Act of 1999, or CARE Act
of 1999, was introduced to the House "to promote the improvement of
information on, and protections against, child sexual abuse."'1 3 The bill
proposed to reduce federal grant monies to states that did not meet spe-
cific requirements of the bill." 4 One of these requirements would have
been to commission a study of state laws regarding the disparity in charg-
ing and sentencing options for the perpetrator of intrafamilial and ex-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Pittman v. State, 460 So.2d 232 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (finding implied
threat of a step-father constituted coercion or force); Parrish v. State, 494 So.2d 705 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1986) (finding implied threat of a mother's boyfriend constituted coercion or
force.)
109. B.E. v. State, 778 So.2d 863 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), overruled by Ex parte J.A.P.,
2002 WL 31002843 (Ala. 2002); Powe v. State, 597 So.2d 721, 723 (Ala. 1991).
110. 2002 WL 31002843, *4-*5 (Al4. 2002).
111. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (2002).
112. Id. Even though Alabama refused to extend the implied threat theory beyond
parents, there is hope. Two other states have extended the implicit threat theory in which
the defendant was a next-door neighbor and a sister's ex-husband. Commonwealth v.
Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa.1986); McQueen v. State, 423 So.2d 800 (Miss. 1982).




trafamilial child sexual abuse, and the resulting effect upon victims. 115 It
would have also required states to address legislative actions necessary to
equalize charging and sentencing perpetrators of sexual abuse without re-
gard to familial relationship of the perpetrator to the child victims.1 16
However, this bill died in a subcommittee and has not been re-introduced
as of September 27, 2002.117
C. New Jersey: Correct Statutory Policy Regarding Intrafamilial Sexual
Abuse Perpetrator Prosecution
The state of New Jersey enacted its sexual assault statute in 1979, which
does not require force to prosecute intrafamilial sexual abuse."' In 1989,
New Jersey incorporated the intrafamilial sexual assault exception to ex-
clude the force required to prove aggravated sexual assault.'1 9 In 1997,
the New Jersey legislature enlarged the scope of the statute, by amending
the definition of aggravated sexual assault to apply whenever the actor
either knows or should have known the victim was either physically help-
less and or mentally incapacitated or defective.' This amendment was
due to the use of date rape drugs across New Jersey, as well as the United
States. 121
Although the amendment was initially introduced as a response to the
threat of date rape drugs, 22 the version ultimately adopted, negated any
specific enhancement requirements and applied the harshest penalties in
accordance with the victim's status instead of the perpetrators acts.1 23
Thus, the effect of the 1989 and 1997 amendments was a justifiable en-
largement of New Jersey's sexual assault statute. Unlike Texas, the cur-
rent New Jersey law focuses on the condition of the victim at the time of
the sexual assault instead of the actions of the perpetrator, or lack
thereof, to apply the harshest punishment. 124
New Jersey has two requirements that will constitute force.125 First,
when the sexual assault is attempted and or committed by multiple per-




118. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West).
119. 1989 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 228 (West).
120. 1997 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 194 (West); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2002).
121. 1997 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 194 (West).






showing of force is not needed due to the aggravating circumstances. 126
Secondly, if during the commission of the sexual assault, the perpetrator
is armed with a weapon and threatens by word or gesture to use it, the
requirement of force is met.127
In 1983, the Supreme Court of New Jersey remarked that intrafamilial
crime was one of the most disturbing aspects of contemporary life. 128
The governor of New Jersey in the mid-1980s responded to the problem
by establishing a task force to study intrafamilial sexual assault. 12 9 As a
result, the Legislature classified intrafamilial sexual assault differently
than sexual assaults occurring in general.130 Accordingly, "the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual penetration occurred;" that
the victim is at least thirteen years of age, but less than sixteen years of
age when the incident happened; and that the perpetrator and the victim
are related to the third degree to obtain a conviction of aggravated sexual
assault.t3l
Along with the statutory exception, the New Jersey Court of Appeals
has allowed prior incidents of sexual abuse between the same victim and
a family perpetrator to be used as evidence in the current charge.' 32 The
court reasoned that this type of evidence is critical to the jury's under-
standing of why a victim thirteen to sixteen years of age may not resist
the perpetrator's advances. 133 By allowing prior incidents of sexual
abuse, New Jersey extends the circumstances that should be used to facili-
tate the victim to prosecute their family perpetrator.
126. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a)(3) (West 1995 & Supp. 2003).
127. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (a)(4) (West 1995 & Supp. 2003).
128. See State v. Hodge, 471 A.2d 389, 394 (N.J. 1983) (noting that in 1983, then Gov-
ernor Kean created a task force to examine "the problem of child abuse.")
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Campbell v. Scheidemantel, Civ. A. No. 89-4637, 1990 WL 182333 at *7 (D.N.J.
1990).
132. State v. L.P., 768 A.2d 795, 801-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
133. See id. (noting that the evidence was allowed because: 1) "young children do not
think in terms of dates or time spans," 2) the victim was unlikely to be able to differentiate
the details of sexual offenses, for example the thirteenth rape as opposed to the fourteenth
rape, 3) the victim's experience began with the most traumatic rape, and thus would grow
less able to differentiate between the rapes, and 4) "the testimony about the earliest at-
tacks was critical to the jury's understanding of the facts and context of the crime").
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D. Texas: Legislator's Failure to Protect Adolescent Victims of
Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse
In 1983, Texas enacted a statute recognizing the crime of aggravated
sexual assault.134 Examples of additional aggravating circumstances are
serious bodily injury or an attempt to cause death of the victim.' 35 Ag-
gravated sexual assault could also be found if the acts or words of the
perpetrator placed the victim in fear of death, serious bodily injury or
kidnapping, or the perpetrator used or exhibited a deadly weapon.
136
The statute also included that if a victim was less than fourteen years of
age the requirements of serious bodily injury, fear of death by the victim
or the use of a deadly weapon were not needed to prove aggravated sex-
ual assault.1 37 Currently, the adolescent victim between fourteen and six-
teen years of age must prove force resulting in serious bodily injury to
seek aggravated sexual assault.138
This statute has been amended seven times since enacted in 1983.139 In
1987, legislators amended this section to include the actual requirements
for the offense of sexual assault along with the mitigating factors to estab-
lish aggravated sexual assault.'4 ° The statute was amended again in a
called session of the 1987 legislation to add language to include sexual
assault of male children because the previous statute was female ori-
ented.14' In 1993, the legislature added the second condition that would
substitute for the force requirement. 42 if a perpetrator acted in concert
with another to commit an act of sexual assault on another, the perpetra-
tor could be charged with aggravated sexual assault without proving
134. See Act of June 19, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 977 §3, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 5315





138. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.021 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2003). The statute
refers to §22.011(c) to define a child. A "child" is a person who is younger than seventeen
years of age" and "not the spouse of the actor." Id.
139. See id. The historical and statutory notes indicate the statute has been amended
seven times since 1983. Id.
140. Act of June 19, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 977 § 3, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 5315
(amended 1987) (current version TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §22.021) (Vernon 1994 & Supp.
2003).
141. Act of Aug. 3, 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 16 § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2nd
C.S. 16 (amended 1993) (current version TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §22.021) (Vernon 1994 &
Supp. 2003).
142. Act of June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, §1.01, sec. 22.021, 1993 Tex. Sess.




force.' 4 3 In 1995 and 1999, the Texas legislators added two more excep-
tions from the force requirement.144 The 1995 amendment provided that
if a perpetrator committed an act of sexual assault on someone over the
age of sixty-five, it was considered aggravated sexual assault and no force
was needed. 4 5 In 1999, the legislators added that if certain drugs were
administered in order to facilitate the sexual assault, it would be consid-
ered aggravated sexual assault and no force was needed.146
To summarize, Texas has implemented the following exceptions from
the force requirement resulting of aggravated sexual assault. The excep-
tions from the force requirement are if the victim is younger than four-
teen years of age or the victim is sixty-five years of age or older. 14 7 Force
occurs if the actor uses or "exhibits a deadly weapon in the course of the
same criminal episode," acts with an accomplice in a sexual assault
against the same victim, or administers a drug referred to as date rape
drugs.148
Texas case law has interpreted the requirements of forcible rape and
rape of a female under the age of eighteen, which later becomes sexual
assault and aggravated sexual assault. In 1950, the Texas Criminal Court
of Appeals stated that a child who was sixteen years of age and sexually
assaulted by her father still had the duty to resist her father by using all
force in her power. 149 The father was required to put forth the force to
overcome his daughter's resistance.' Therefore, if there is no resistance
to overcome then there is no forcible rape. The court then recognized
that the resistance of a child would naturally be less than an adult female
and even less when the sexual assault involved a parent. 5 ' Sadly, the
Texas Criminal Court of Appeals did not expand on this theory.' 52 In
1969, the same court determined that no rape had occurred when a step-
143. Id.
144. Act of June 7, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 318 §7, sec. 22.021, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. Ch. 318 (Vernon) (current version at TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §22.021) (Vernon 1994 &
Supp. 2003).
145. Id.
146. See Act of Sept. 1, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 417 §1, sec. 22.021, 1999 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. Ch. 417 (Vernon) (current version at TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §22.021) (Vernon
1994 & Supp. 2003).
147. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.021 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2003).
148. Id.
149. Lewis v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 329, 331, 226 S.W.2d 861, 863 (1950).
150. Id.
151. See id. at 863-64 (1950) (suggesting that because the girl was the daughter of the
accused, a different degree of resistance might be considered.)
152. See Zamora v. State, 449 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (ruling that while
the prosecutrix "being the child of the father, reared by him, and under tutelage and gui-
dance, might call for a different degree of resistance than if the accused were a stranger,"
she nevertheless "is expected to exercise some resistance to her father's advances").
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father had sexual relations with his stepdaughter because the stepdaugh-
ter did not resist in anyway, cry out nor did her stepfather have to use
force.' 53 The court weighed these factors along with the fact that the sex-
ual contact between the two had been ongoing for six years and con-
cluded that the conduct did not constitute rape.' 5 4  The court
distinguished this case from previous convictions of intrafamilial sexual
abuse on the grounds that there was no resistance by the victim.1 55 The
court further stated that the threats that occurred after the incident would
not meet the force requirement because they were not made to cause the
child to yield to the father's sexual advances.
15 6
In 1986, Texas seemingly extended the implied threat to include situa-
tions that involved intrafamilial sexual abuse.' 57 It was a false implication
of the implied threat because the charge was sexual assault not aggra-
vated sexual assault, because no proof of force was found. Even though
the court did not find serious bodily injury resulting from force, they con-
ceded when a "person involuntarily faces distasteful options, it is very
human to select that option that is least distasteful.' 158 The court further
conceded that the father had created an environment where the child was
forced to submit to his wishes or face the alternative beatings.159 After
conceding to a possible implied threat, the court did not find serious bod-
ily injury had occurred or that any threats of death or serious bodily in-
jury had occurred and thus did not constitute a charge of aggravated
sexual assault. 160
E. Statutory Proposal to Correct Current Positive Results for
Perpetrators of Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse
In order for Texas to correct the current aggravated sexual assault stat-
ute in regards to intrafamilial sexual assault, the legislature should enact a
bill adding another exception to the force requirement of aggravated sex-
ual assault. The proposed addition to the current aggravated sexual abuse
statute follows:
153. Id.
154. See id. (finding "that evidence was insufficient" because victim failed to struggle
against her stepfather).
155. See id. (concluding that the facts indicated that the sixteen year old victim "went
to the [perpetrator's] bedroom on the date in question..., [did] not try to leave, t[ook] off
part of her clothes at his request, m[ade] no outcry, and d[id] not resist in any way even
though she acknowledge[d] she knew what was going to happen when she sat on the bed").
156. Id.
157. Smith v. State, 719 S.W.2d 402, 403-04 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no
writ).
158. Id. at 403.




§ 22.021. Aggravated Sexual Assault
(a) A person commits an offense:
(1) if the person:
(A) intentionally or knowingly:
(i) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual
organ of another person by any means, without that
person's consent;
(ii) causes the penetration of the mouth of another per-
son by the sexual organ of the actor, without that per-
son's consent; or
(iii) causes the sexual organ of another person, without
that person's consent, to contact or penetrate the
mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, includ-
ing the actor; or
(B) intentionally or knowingly:
(i) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual
organ of a child by any means;
(ii) causes the penetration of the mouth of a child by
the sexual organ of the actor;
(iii) causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or pen-
etrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another per-
son, including the actor;
(iv) causes the anus of a child to contact the mouth,
anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the
actor; or
(v) causes the mouth of a child to contact the anus or
sexual organ of another person, including the actor; and
(2) if:
(A) the person:
(i) causes serious bodily injury or attempts to cause the
death of the victim or another person in the course of
the same criminal episode;
(ii) by acts or words places the victim in fear that death,
serious bodily injury, or kidnapping will be imminently
inflicted on any person;
(iii) by acts or words occurring in the presence of the
victim threatens to cause the death, serious bodily in-
jury, or kidnapping of any person;
(iv) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon in the course of
the same criminal episode;
(v) acts in concert with another who engages in conduct
described by Subdivision (1) directed toward the same




(vi) administers or provides flunitrazepam, otherwise
known as rohypnol, gamma hydroxybutyrate, or
ketamine to the victim of the offense with the intent of
facilitating the commission of the offense;
(B) the victim is younger than 14 years of age; or
(C) the victim is at least 14 but less than 16 years of age; and
[i] the actor is related to the victim to the by blood or
affinity to the third degree; or
[ii] the actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over
the victim by virtue of the actor's legal, professional, or
occupational status; or
[iii] the actor is a foster parent, a guardian, or stands in
loco parentis within the household; or
<(C)> [D] the victim is 65 years of age or older.
(b) In this section, "child" has the meaning assigned that term by
Section 22.011(c).
(c) An aggravated sexual assault under this section is without the
consent of the other person if the aggravated sexual assault occurs
under the same circumstances listed in Section 22.011(b).
(d) The defense provided by Section 22.011(d) applies to this
section.
(e) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree. 161
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Unfairness of the Current Aggravated Sexual Assault Statute to
Victims of Intrafamilial Sexual Assault
It is regarded as axiomatic that parents have more power than chil-
dren... children need the unconditional protection and nurturance of
their parents for healthy development; they cannot provide care in re-
turn. Parents may find many rewards in the raising of children, but
they cannot expect their own needs for food, clothing, shelter, or sex to
be fulfilled by their children.162
The current requirements of aggravated sexual assault are unfair to vic-
tims of intrafamilial sexual abuse. They are unfair because courts reason
that previous sexual activity usually equates to consent. 163 If the sexual
abuse occurred repeatedly, the victim was considered able to consent. If
161. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 2003). Section that is in bold is
suggested additional material. Material surrounded by <> are deletions.
162. HERMAN, supra note 24, at 3-4.
163. Maryanne Lyons, Adolescents in Jeopardy: An Analysis of Texas' Promiscuity De-
fense for Sexual Assault, 29 Hous. L. REV. 583, 597 (1992).
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the victim is able to consent, the victim, regardless of their age, is re-
quired to resist and the perpetrator has to use force for the sexual act to
be considered sexual assault. The victims of intrafamilial sexual assault
rarely suffer serious bodily injury at the hands of their family perpetra-
tor.164 The family perpetrator rarely has to use force to sexually assault a
family member. Therefore, because the dynamics of intrafamilial sexual
assault1 65 are not addressed by the requirements of aggravated sexual as-
sault, victims are unfairly prevented from seeking the highest penalty pos-
sible for sexual assault. 166
The court also unfairly reasons that a long period of sexual abuse is
indicative of the victim's consent. This line of reasoning should no longer
be followed for two reasons. First, victims of intrafamilial sexual abuse
are usually abused over a period of many years before it is discovered.16 7
This long period of time is associated with the relationship between the
parties more than the consent or promiscuity of the victim. 168 The power
the parental or authority figure has over the victim in providing essential
needs, and threats to other family members is more likely the reasons for
compliance than consent. 169 Additionally, the shame and guilt the victim
has about the sexual acts forced upon them combined with the desire to
please the parent, obtain essential necessities of life for themselves and
possibly other family members is enough to keep the adolescent victim
quiet.170
164. See Lindberg & Distad, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders in Women Who Exper-
ienced Childhood Incest, 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 329, 330 (1985) (relating that the
most significant and long-lasting effect of intrafamilial sexual abuse is the victim's impaired
emotionality).
165. See Camille W. Cook & Pamela Kirkwood Millsaps, Redressing Wrongs Of The
Blamelessly Ignorant Survivor Of Incest, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1991) (stating that an
incestuously abusive father is careful not to beat his daughter to the extent that medical
attention is necessary, or to the extent that outside attention is focused on his daughter's
injuries or his abuse).
166. CHILD ABUSE REPORTED TO THE POLICE, supra note 12 (stating that "sentences
for offenders against teenage victims were less severe than for other offenders").
167. See MARY DE YOUNG, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF CHILDREN 37 (1982)
(stating the average duration of an incestuous affair is 2.7 years in Young's clinical sample).
168. See HERMAN, supra note 24, at 3 (stating that the father and daughter, adult male
and female child, relationship is one of the most unequal relationships imaginable). "The
actual sexual encounter may be brutal or tender, painful or pleasurable; but it is always,
inevitably, destructive to the child. The father, in effect, forces the daughter to pay with
her body for affection and care which should be freely given." Id.
169. See Thomas, supra note 7 (stating that victims of "intrafamilial sexual abuse, the
child's reluctance to seek intervention is compounded by the child's emotional and finan-
cial dependency").
170. Melissa G. Salten, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Vic-
tim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 198 (1984).
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Second, repeatedly committing intrafamilial sexual abuse is an aggra-
vating factor that should increase the severity of the crime and the perpe-
trator's propensity for crime, rather than strengthen the notion of consent
by the adolescent. This repetitive criminal activity is not treated as con-
sent by a victim in regards to theft, murder or battery and should not be
treated as such in the case of intrafamilial sexual abuse.
Also unfair is the current statutory implication that adolescents four-
teen to sixteen years of age possess the ability to protect themselves from
an unwanted sexual encounter, especially from a family member. Ado-
lescent victims who suffer at the hands of family members are in fear for
their own lives. Their choice is food, clothing, shelter, safety for them-
selves or for other family members with compliance or the possibility of
no food, clothing, shelter or physical suffering or the suffering of other
family members if there is non-compliance' 71 . When these possible
choices are presented, society should not assume that adolescents four-
teen to sixteen years of age possess the ability to protect themselves from
unwanted sexual encounters by family members who may hold what
seems to the adolescent victim as their whole lives in their control.
B. Policy of Non-Interference in the Family Furthers the Situation Ripe
for Continued Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse
Texas should realize that there are situations where the family unit
does not need to be preserved because the family itself can be an instru-
ment of sexual abuse.172 The parent or authority figure has a position of
trust and authority over the younger family member. This same position
of trust and authority can be used to tell the victim that the sexual contact
is normal or expected behavior in their family.173
Due to the position of trust and authority of the family member, the
perpetrator has long periods of time to groom their victim.' 74 The perpe-
trator can establish this by sleeping with their victims in the nude, giving
them baths and accidentally fondling them. The perpetrator will also find
ways for the victim to see them nude to make it seem more natural and
right. All these grooming actions establish a confusing situation for a
child who loves and wants to please the parental figure. The step from
171. See DE YOUNG, supra note 167, at 37-38 (stating that some incestuous relation-
ships are continued through force and threats against other family members).
172. See John R. Schmidt, Forward, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 1197, 1200 (1998) (noting that
when dealing with intrafamilial sexual abuse we must break down cultural taboos that have
kept it from view because of historical patriarchal control).
173. See Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal.App.3d 1609, 1616, 265 Cal.Reptr. 605, 609
(1990) (stating that intrafamilial sexual abuse may be accomplished "by teaching the child
that the sexual acts are normal or necessary to the relationship").
174. Loue, supra note 2, at 479.
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sleeping together and touching to sexual intercourse may proceed over
years and may never have required force. Force, if used, may have only
been required in the beginning of the sexual assaults and after continued
abuse is no longer needed by the perpetrator. The long period of access
to the victim by the family perpetrator combined with their position of
trust and authority, and the unwillingness to separate family members
furthers the situation for continued abuse by the family perpetrator.
As long as Texas hesitates to interfere in the family by focusing on
force and serious bodily injury, the adolescent victim will continue to suf-
fer intrafamilial sexual assault. By focusing on the adolescent victims'
action of resistance, force and serious bodily injury, the court has to focus
less on the family perpetrator and the action of having sexual intercourse
with a child.175 The less the court has to focus on the family perpetrator
and his/her action, the less we as a society have to deal with the real
problem of family members who violate the sanctity of the family for
their own deviate sexual desires. This reasoning to keep the family unit
together furthers the most powerful tool of the family perpetrator, which
is their position in the family.
With the above policy and judicial gymnastics to avoid the possible un-
true allegation of an incestuous relationship, it would seem that as a col-
lective society we do not wish to confront the family perpetrator. 176 The
act of incestuous sexual abuse is too ugly to confront with a law that
would say to family perpetrators unequivocally it is wrong. Our society
continues to believe that it only happens in other families and places
blame on the victim if it does happen.177 This keeps society from individ-
ually examining one's own life. A life which may include sexual feelings
for older family members or sexual interplay. 178 The distance keeps soci-
ety from recognizing and accepting possible sexual feelings for their own
children as they grow.1 79 This aversion to accept our own experiences
175. See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger. The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law' , Response to Racism, 42 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129-30 (stat-
ing that the government must hear the full range of legitimate concerns, no matter how
indelicately expressed or painful they may be to hear).
176. See id. (stating that similar to rape victims, victims of racism must prove they did
not distort the circumstances, misunderstand the intent, or even enjoy it).
177. See DE YOUNG supra note 167, at 24 (stating that conclusions such as the female
victim of incest is to blame for reasons like favoring her mother physically and stating that
the daughter seduces or encourages the incest place blame on the victim and minimize the
roles of the father perpetrators).
178. See HERMAN supra note 24, at 130 (noting the common reaction of intrafamilial
sexual abuse is shock and outrage then followed by denial).
179. See JEFFREY J. HAUGAARD & N. DICKON Ruppucci, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN 108 (1988) (stating that whether the strong "emotional reaction is a result of the
repressed incest desires, an innate aversion to incest, or some other aspect of the human
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prevents society from openly discussing intrafamilial sexual abuse and de-
veloping appropriate laws addressing the matter.""0 Society must ac-
knowledge that a thought about our children does not make us the same
as those that commit the act of intrafamilial sexual assault.
C. Incorrectness of Federal Programs Forcing States to Ignore
Intrafamilial Sexual Assault
The federal government should not pass "The Care Act of 1999" to
protect children of every state from intrafamilial sexual abuse. If re-in-
troduced and passed, adolescent victims of intrafamilial sexual assault
would suffer more when states do not fully comply and subsequently lose
funding. The adolescent victim would lose on two levels. The child
would lose any state money available to receive help and would not be
able to prosecute the family perpetrator to the fullest degree because the
state's laws have not changed. Policy should be changed in every state by
their state legislation. Every state should implement an exception to
their highest degree of sexual assault so that an adolescent victim of in-
trafamilial sexual assault will not have to prove force. This would be the
same exception Texas currently provides for sexual assault victims who
are under fourteen years of age, over sixty-five years of age, and victims
who are incapacitated in some way so they cannot resist their perpetrator.
D. Correction of Past Policies that Left the Adolescent Victim of
Intrafamilial Sexual Assault Unprotected
To correct this gap in protection for adolescent victims of intrafamilial
sexual abuse legislators must implement two changes. First, legislators
must remove the incest statutes from the criminal code. Currently, the
incest statute only protects females from intrafamilial sexual intercourse
by male family members. 8 ' Both males and females are victims of in-
trafamilial sexual abuse and both need protection. In addition, the pre-
mise behind incest is that it is an offense against society in which both
parties ordinarily engage with the same intent and purpose as princi-
psyche is not known. But the reality is that something clearly drives most of us to avoid
not only incest experiences but also incestuous thoughts").
180. See DE YOUNG, supra note 167, at 161 (noting that there are prices to pay for
ignorance to incest has "served as a foundation upon which many legal and social practices
have been built, sexually victimized children are being constantly revictimized by a system
and a society unwilling to confront the problem").
181. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.02 (Vernon 1994) (defining "sexual intercourse as
any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ" and "deviate sexual inter-




pals.182 Assumingly, if both parties engage in incest with the same intent
they are both adults and not in reliance on the other for the necessities of
life and free to make their own decisions. In addition, the incest statutes
do not refer to any age requirement. Thus, any one of any age involved
in a relationship with another that is too closely related is punishable by a
third degree felony, which is punishable by no more than 10 years but not
less than two years. As we have historically looked at the incest laws they
were meant to apply to adults, not children. To correct this discrepancy
in applicability, legislators need to add language making the statute appli-
cable only to those over the age of seventeen. Once the incest statute is
removed from the criminal code, perpetrators of intrafamilial sexual as-
sault can only be prosecuted under the sexual assault and aggravated sex-
ual assault statutes.
Secondly, legislators must implement the intrafamilial sexual assault
exception to the force requirement of aggravated sexual assault. This ex-
ception will delete any confusion on which statute to charge the perpetra-
tor of intrafamilial sexual abuse under and delete any need for
prosecutors to charge bargain with perpetrators. This exception will also
take into account the special relationship between the perpetrator and
the victim that usually does not include force. The exception will also
recognize and validate research and findings by the psychology, medical
and law enforcement fields regarding the dynamics of intrafamilial sexual
abuse. The resulting aggravated sexual assault statute will protect any
child under the age of fourteen from sexual assault regardless of the rela-
tion to the perpetrator. Furthermore, the resulting statute will protect
those adolescents fourteen to sixteen years of age to the same extent if
the perpetrator were within a certain degree of relation to the victim.
This exception will not provide more protection to a certain class of ado-
lescents but provide harsher penalties to perpetrators who prey on their
own young family members.
Texas should push for approval of these statutory changes because cur-
rently the judiciary interprets intrafamilial sexual assault as any other sex-
ual assault that does not result in serious bodily injury. If we leave the
policy determination up to the courts, then adolescents who suffer sexual
abuse by family members are at the mercy of judicial interpretations of
the implied threat to seek a higher charge against their perpetrator.
Texas should not allow the prosecution of a family perpetrator to be de-
termined by judicial interpretation that can be eroded or reversed de-
pending on who is hearing the case. This was seen in Alabama courts
182. See id. (stating the statute to qualify for incest but not mentioning any require-
ment for consent by the victim or force by the perpetrator, thus both parties can be in
agreement to the sexual act and still violate the statute).
2003]
THE SCHOLAR
where there is also no statutory exception for victims of intrafamilial sex-
ual assault. 18
3
Neither should society settle for an empty exception to the sexual as-
sault statute by our legislators.' 84 This empty exception has been adopted
by many states and provides no more protection to victims of in-
trafamilial sexual assault than before the exception.185 Perpetrators of
intrafamilial sexual assault would receive a charge of sexual assault with
or without the exception. So the exception in most states provides no
more protection and the aggravating factor is still the use of force result-
ing in serious bodily injury. Since serious bodily injury resulting from
force rarely occurs in intrafamilial sexual assault the victims is kept from
seeking a higher penalty because of the dynamics that brought about the
crime. The perpetrator has benefited from sexually assaulting his rela-
tives rather than seeking other non-related children. 86
With these changes to the laws regarding aggravated sexual assault,
Texas will send an appropriate message to perpetrators of intrafamilial
sexual assault. The message will be that if a parent or a person in position
of authority or trust engages in sexual intercourse with a family member
or someone in their care, they will suffer the possible penalty of life im-
prisonment. This is regardless of their own beliefs in regards to what they
can do with their own children, their mental state, or whether or not they
used force or caused serious bodily injury to the victim. This exception to
the statute will not promote the family status of the perpetrator but pro-
tect the victim of intrafamilial sexual assault.
V. CONCLUSION
Currently, Texas fails to protect the adolescent victim of intrafamilial
sexual assault fourteen to sixteen years of age because the statute re-
quires force resulting in serious bodily injury to seek aggravated sexual
assault rather than sexual assault. The current statute fails because in-
trafamilial sexual assault does not usually result in serious bodily injury.
The position of a parent or an older sibling may not need to threaten the
183. ALA. CODE § 13A- 6-61 (2003).
184. See Robert E. Freeman-Longo, The Treatment of Sex Offenders: Reducing Sexual
Abuse in America: Legislating Tougher Laws or Public Education and Prevention, 23 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 303, 316 (1997).
185. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1405 to -1410 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-124 (Michie 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 772 (2001); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30-9-11, 30-9-13 (Michie 2002); MINN. STAT. § 609.342-.343 (West 1987 & Supp.
2003).
186. See Andrew Vachss, Our Endangered Species: A Hard Look At How We Treat
Our Children, PARADE, Mar. 29, 1998 (stating that we provide a special immunity for
predators who grow their own children).
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victim with serious bodily injury, or death to participate in an unwanted
sexual act. The closeness and authoritative role of an older family mem-
ber may be in itself an implied threat known to the victim as "Do what I
say or you know what will happen." Texas should not imply by statute
that those adolescents who suffer serious bodily injury or threats thereof
are more damaged than those adolescents who suffer in silent compli-
ance. This reasoning is an exercise in diverting attention from the family
perpetrator and ignoring the costs to adolescents. In recognizing the cost
of intrafamilial sexual assault to adolescent victims,' 87 Texas should not
require a showing of force that results in serious bodily injury or threats
of death or serious bodily injury to prove aggravated sexual assault for
victims fourteen to sixteen years of age of intrafamilial sexual abuse.
In addition, neither should Texas rely on the courts' possible interpre-
tation of the implied threat to constitute aggravated sexual assault to nul-
lify the need for statutory exception. The Texas courts currently only
extend the implied threat of intrafamilial sexual abuse to a charge of sex-
ual assault. Since, a sexual assault charge does not require serious bodily
injury resulting from force this interpretation of implied threat is unnec-
essary. In essence, Texas is stating that intrafamilial sexual assault should
not be considered as serious bodily injury to adolescent victims. On the
contrary, adolescent victims of intrafamilial abuse suffer life long compli-
cations' 88 due to this abuse that affects society as a whole.
In adopting this exception, Texas will protect all children regardless of
age or presence of force, who suffer sexual abuse at the hands of family
members. As a result, all incidents of intrafamilial sexual abuse will con-
stitute aggravated sexual assault. The judge or jury will have discretion to
review the totality of circumstances when determining the punishment of
the perpetrator.
Lastly, this exception would delete the comfort that some intrafamilial
perpetrators find with the current rule. The prospect of a life sentence
may keep someone from violating this statute and also encourage a victim
to come forward with the knowledge that the courts will not question
their compliance as consent but as a method to survive.
187. See DAVID FINKELHOR, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 143-52
(1986) (showing that short-term affects as reactions occurring within two years of the abuse
fear, anger, hostility, guilt and shame. Long-term affects anxiety and distress, pregnancy,
inappropriate sexual behavior, runaways and delinquency).
188. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children At Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female
Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 277-78 (2001) (relating that although
some symptoms of sexual abuse may be short lived, others become ingrained, altering even
a child's physiology). Along with experiencing posttraumatic stress disorder, anger aggres-
sive behavior, poor self-image, depression, suicidal ideation, there is evidence that victims
of sexual abuse also have elevated hormone levels together with evidence of earlier onset
of puberty. Id.
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